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 i Redeﬁning Readiness
Executive Summary
T
he Redeﬁning Readiness Study is the ﬁrst opportunity the American people have 
had to describe how they would react to protective instructions in two terrorist 
attacks: a smallpox outbreak and the explosion of a dirty bomb. This information 
is critically important because the plans currently being developed to deal with these 
situations are based on expert assumptions about what people would be concerned about 
and how they would behave. If planners’ assumptions about the public are wrong — as 
they have been in the past — the plans being developed will not work as expected, and a 
large number of people who should be protected will be unnecessarily harmed. 
This study is unique in terms of its perspective, rigor, and content. Preliminary work 
included conﬁdential, in-depth conversations with government and private-sector 
planners and an extensive review of the literature to identify the critical assumptions 
about the public on which current plans are based. We also engaged a diverse spectrum 
of community residents around the country in 14 group discussions to identify a frame 
of reference for thinking about terrorism preparedness planning that is meaningful to 
the general public. Incorporating what we learned, we ﬁelded a telephone survey of 
2,545 randomly selected adult residents of households in the continental United States. 
Conducted in English and Spanish, with oversampling of African Americans and people 
in the two cities that experienced the 9/11 attacks, the survey achieved an excellent 
response rate.
The study uses scenarios that put people in smallpox and dirty bomb situations at a 
place and time they would be likely to hear about the attack and be told what to do. The 
smallpox scenario explores how people would react to instructions to go to a public site 
to be vaccinated if some residents in their community and people in other parts of the 
country became sick with smallpox after having been exposed to the virus in an attack 
at a major airport. The dirty bomb scenario explores how the public would react to 
instructions to stay inside a building other than their own home if a dirty bomb exploded 
a mile from where they were and a cloud containing radioactive dust were moving in their 
direction. In addition to these scenarios, the study also explored people’s interest in, and 
perspectives about, their community’s terrorism planning activities.
ii E X E C U T I V E   S U M M A R Y 
Below, we highlight key ﬁndings from the study report, focusing on: 
the public’s reactions to the smallpox and dirty bomb situations; 
the public’s redeﬁnition of readiness in these situations; and
the public’s role in future planning eﬀorts.
THE PUBLIC’S REACTIONS TO THE SMALLPOX AND DIRTY BOMB SITUATIONS 
Far fewer people than needed would follow protective instructions in these two terrorist 
attack situations. 
Only two-ﬁfths of the American people would go to the vaccination site in 
the smallpox outbreak.
Only three-ﬁfths of the American people would shelter in place for as long as 
told in the dirty bomb explosion. 
One reason for this lack of cooperation is that many people would be seriously worried 
about something other than what planners are trying to protect them from. 
Two-ﬁfths of the American people would be seriously worried about what 
government oﬃcials would say or do. This concern is even more prevalent among 
members of the public who are Hispanic, African-American, foreign-born, have 
a low income, lack health insurance coverage, live in New York City, or have not 
attended college. People’s trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions is important 
because people who don’t have a lot of trust are only half as likely to cooperate in 
the smallpox and dirty bomb situations as are those who do.
Three-ﬁfths of the American people would have serious worries about the 
smallpox vaccine — that’s twice as many people as would be seriously worried 
about catching smallpox in the outbreak situation. 
Worries about vaccine side eﬀects would make one-ﬁfth of the American 
population afraid to follow instructions to go to the vaccination site. 
The public’s worries appear to be well founded since it is estimated that 
over 50 million people in this country have conditions that put them at 
risk of developing serious complications from the vaccine, either from 
being vaccinated themselves or from accidentally coming in contact with 









 iii Redeﬁning Readiness
Half of the American people — and two-thirds of African Americans 
— would be seriously worried if they were told that the smallpox vaccine 
is investigational. More people would be seriously worried about this 
issue than about any other aspect of the smallpox situation. Concern 
about the investigational status of the vaccine would make one-third of 
the population decide not to get it, even if they were at the vaccination site 
already.
Many people would face conﬂicting worries and trade-oﬀs in these situations, which 
would make it very diﬃcult for them to decide what the most protective course of action 
would be.
Three-quarters of the people who would be seriously worried about catching 
smallpox in the outbreak situation also would be seriously worried about the 
vaccine. People who are only worried about catching smallpox are three times 
more likely to cooperate as those who are not. But that increase in cooperation is 
completely eliminated when people are also seriously worried about the vaccine. 
Two-thirds of the American people would try to avoid being in the same place 
with other people they don’t know in the smallpox situation. But going to a 
public vaccination site violates people’s inclination toward protective isolation. 
Two-ﬁfths of the population would be afraid of catching smallpox from other 
people at the site. One-ﬁfth would be afraid of coming in contact with people at 
the site who shouldn’t be exposed to anyone who recently got the vaccine.
In the dirty bomb situation, many people face conﬂicting obligations, and 
assuring the safety of people who are dependent on them is often more important 
than assuring their own safety. One-third of the people who would not cooperate 
fully in this situation would leave the shelter of their building in order to take care 
of their children; one-quarter would leave to take care of other family members.
A substantial number of people would be able to cooperate with protective instructions 
if certain conditions were met, but those conditions are not met now. 
Three-quarters of the people who said they would not fully cooperate with 
instructions to stay inside the building in the dirty bomb situation would do so 






iv E X E C U T I V E   S U M M A R Y 
and their loved ones were in places that had prepared in advance to take good care 
of them in this kind of situation. But three-ﬁfths of the American population 
know only a little or nothing at all about how people would actually be cared for 
in those places. Overall, the American people are half as likely to cooperate in 
the dirty bomb situation if they don’t know a lot about their building’s shelter-in-
place plans than if they do. And they are half as likely to cooperate if they lack 
conﬁdence in their community’s preparedness plans than if they don’t.
Not surprisingly, considering the serious worries and trade-oﬀs people face, many people 
would want more information or advice to decide what to do in these situations. 
Members of the public are looking for decision-making support, not just facts, 
and they want to be able to talk with someone beforehand, not just during an 
attack. 
For free telephone support from a trained person in the smallpox situation, 
considerably more people would ﬁnd it very helpful to talk with someone who 
they know wants what is best for them (like their health practitioner) than to talk 
with someone they don’t know who works for their local government. 
THE PUBLIC’S REDEFINITION OF READINESS IN THESE TWO TERRORIST ATTACK SITUATIONS 
The ﬁndings presented above are cause for worry because they suggest that current plans to 
deal with smallpox and dirty bomb attacks will be far less eﬀective than planners want or 
the public deserves. Although the study is based on a hypothetical scenario, our ﬁndings 
need to be taken seriously because the way the American people say they would react to 
instructions in the smallpox outbreak is consistent with the actual behavior of health care 
workers in the CDC Smallpox Vaccination Program. If three-ﬁfths of the American people 
were reluctant to follow instructions in a smallpox outbreak, the protection of large-scale 
vaccination might not be achieved, even if planners worked out all of the challenging 
logistics involved in dispensing the vaccine. If two-ﬁfths of the American population 
were reluctant to shelter in place in a dirty bomb explosion, many people would be 
unnecessarily exposed to dangerous dust and radiation, and ﬁrst responders would face 
excess traﬃc and congestion in getting to the scene of the explosion.
•
•
 v Redeﬁning Readiness
Planners have been focusing a lot of attention on public education and risk 
communication, but our study suggests that informing people what they should do in 
these terrorist attack situations will not be suﬃcient to garner their timely cooperation. 
On a more optimistic note, the study shows how, by addressing the public’s concerns, 
planners can develop more behaviorally realistic approaches for dealing with smallpox 
and dirty bomb attacks and, as a result, protect many more people than would otherwise 
be possible. 
The report describes what plans to deal with these two kinds of terrorist attacks would 
look like if they incorporated the public’s perspectives. As readers will see, looking at 
preparedness planning through the public’s eyes redeﬁnes the notion of protection. 
In the smallpox situation, the public’s insights emphasize the importance of developing 
plans that protect everyone at risk: not only the people who are at risk of contracting 
smallpox, but also the large number of people who are at risk of developing serious 
complications from the vaccine. 
In the dirty bomb situation, the public’s insights emphasize that people not only need to 
be protected from dangerous dust and radiation. They also need to know that they and 
their loved ones would be safe and cared for in whatever building they happen to be in 
at the time of an explosion. To make such protection possible, a broad array of places — 
work sites, shops, malls, schools, day care centers, hospitals, clinics, cultural institutions, 
recreational and entertainment facilities, government buildings, apartment buildings, 
and transportation terminals — have to be able to serve as safe havens for people should 
the need arise. The managers of these places need to recognize that it is as important to 
prepare to serve as a safe haven as to be able to evacuate people in the event of a ﬁre or an 
explosion.
The American people’s perspectives also redeﬁne how public protection can best 
be achieved. To a large extent, this involves the development of community and 
organizational plans that address people’s concerns, minimize the conﬂicts and trade-oﬀs 
they would face, and support them in choosing the best protective action.
As the plans in the report illustrate, many of these actions need to be taken now, well 
before an attack occurs. 
vi E X E C U T I V E   S U M M A R Y 
Examples related to the smallpox situation include: 
strategies to enable everyone in the country to determine their own vaccine 
risk status and that of the other members of their household; 
the training of health care practitioners and other community members to 
provide people with decision-making support; and 
the involvement of community leaders — particularly among the African-
American population — in overseeing the development and testing of 
vaccines.
Examples related to the dirty bomb situation include the development of: 
conﬁdence-generating safe-haven plans in the broad array of buildings and 
places where people frequently are; and 
back-up systems that can maintain telephone and e-mail service for the general 
public in the event of a large-scale emergency.
The plans also involve changes in actions that would be taken during the crisis, as the 
following strategies from the smallpox plan illustrate.
Rather than triaging or screening people at public sites, steps would be taken 
to make sure that anyone who is potentially infected or exposed to smallpox or 
who is at risk of developing serious complications from the vaccine stays home 
and does not go to any public vaccination site.
To provide people with accurate information from people they trust, 
government-run telephone networks would be supplemented with a more 
community-embedded telephone support system.
Finally, the plans emphasize the need for communities and the nation to focus on long-
term issues. Reﬂecting the public’s concerns in the dirty bomb situation, for example, the 
plans emphasize the need to discuss and address the potential environmental, economic, 
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THE PUBLIC’S ROLE IN FUTURE PLANNING EFFORTS
The Redeﬁning Readiness Study documents the value of letting the American people 
speak for themselves rather than relying on planners’ untested assumptions about 
what the public cares about and how the public will behave. Moreover, the study 
provides planners in government agencies and private-sector organizations with reliable 
information from the public that they can use to assess and strengthen their plans to 
deal with terrorist-initiated smallpox outbreaks and dirty bomb explosions. Because most 
of the ﬁndings in the study are generalizable, they are applicable to planning eﬀorts 
throughout the country. Some of the strategies in the study’s illustrative plans are also 
applicable to other situations, such as an outbreak of pandemic inﬂuenza or SARS, an 
electrical blackout, or the malfunction of a nuclear reactor.
Planners will need to work with community residents directly, however, to beneﬁt from 
their insights about responding to many other kinds of terrorist attack and emergency 
situations. The study documents that involving people in these kinds of planning 
eﬀorts can accomplish another important objective as well: it can address the trust and 
conﬁdence issues that currently discourage so many members of public from following 
protective instructions. 
The study shows that people are more likely to follow oﬃcial instructions when 
they have a lot of trust in what oﬃcials tell them to do and are conﬁdent that 
their community is prepared to meet their needs if a terrorist attack occurs. 
Currently, the American people’s trust and conﬁdence levels are disturbingly low. 
But elected oﬃcials, government agencies, and private-sector organizations have 
a unique opportunity to build the public’s trust, conﬁdence, and cooperation by 
involving the public directly in planning. When community members are part of 
the planning process, they can be more conﬁdent that planners are actually aware 
of their concerns. When community residents play a role in developing protective 
strategies, they can be more trusting of oﬃcials who instruct them to follow those 
strategies. 
•
viii E X E C U T I V E   S U M M A R Y 
Thus far, the public has had little or no direct involvement in community and 
organizational preparedness planning. The study documents that only a tiny fraction 
of the American people know very much about the plans that are being developed 
in their communities, and it paints a mostly discouraging picture about people’s 
perceptions about current planning activities. 
Large proportions of people think their community isn’t prepared to deal with 
these kinds of terrorist attacks, that planners don’t know about their concerns 
and information needs, that people like them can’t inﬂuence the plans that are 
being developed, and that neither they nor the people they care about would 
receive the help they need when they need it if a terrorist attack were to occur. 
People’s perceptions about the potential beneﬁts of planning are in stark 
contrast to the problems they see. Three-ﬁfths of the American population 
believe that the harm caused by a terrorist attack in their community could 
be reduced a great deal or a lot by preparing ahead of time to deal with the 
eﬀects.
Fortunately for planners, the study documents that a large proportion of the 
American people are interested in community-level planning — not just in learning 
more about plans, but in being actively involved in developing them. 
In New York City and Washington, D.C., where terrorism is a particularly 
salient issue, two-ﬁfths of the population are extremely or very interested in 
personally helping a government agency or other community organization 
develop plans to deal with these kinds of attacks. 
But interest levels are also high in the rest of the country, where people 
think much less about terrorist attacks and believe the possibility of an attack 
is much less likely. In those places, one-third of the population has a strong 





 ix Redeﬁning Readiness
The next challenge is to make it possible for government agencies and private-sector 
organizations to engage the public in planning eﬀorts. Our study demonstrates that 
to make participation meaningful and worthwhile to community residents, the 
process needs to assure them considerable inﬂuence in planning and needs to focus 
their involvement on identifying and addressing the issues they care about a lot. We 
recognize that this kind of inclusive process would entail a substantial change in the way 
many planners currently go about their work and that there are a variety of barriers that 
currently make it diﬃcult for planners to move in this direction. Nonetheless, the stakes 
are too high to continue the status quo. To provide planners with practical models for 
engaging the public in these kinds of activities, our next step will be to support planning 
processes in selected sites around the country that demonstrate exactly how community 
residents can be meaningfully and feasibly engaged. 

 1 Redeﬁning Readiness
Introduction
S
ince September 11, 2001, the United States has invested billions of dollars 
to help government agencies and private-sector organizations prepare to 
respond to terrorist attacks involving biological, chemical, and radiological 
weapons. Responding eﬀectively to such attacks is challenging because it requires 
not only treating people initially aﬀected by the attack, but also taking rapid 
actions to protect a much larger population from the risk of illness or injury. To 
minimize the harm that the public might experience in these situations, plans 
need to incorporate strategies that will protect as many at-risk people as possible. 
Examples include vaccinating people who are at risk of contracting smallpox or 
having people shelter-in-place to avoid exposure to the radioactive dust from a 
dirty bomb. To realize the full beneﬁt of these protective strategies, however, the 
American public needs to participate actively in their implementation. As former 
Senator Sam Nunn stated, playing the U. S. President in the Dark Winter smallpox 
bioterrorist exercise in June 2001, “The federal government has to have the 
cooperation from the American people. There is no federal force out there that can 
require 300,000,000 people to take steps they don’t want to take.”1 (p. 982)
Considering the importance of public behavior in determining the ultimate 
success of terrorism preparedness plans, planners need to know: 
• How are community residents likely to react in these situations?  
• What issues are they most concerned about?  
• What factors determine whether they will do what they are told?
Currently, planners don’t have direct answers to these questions because the 
public has had little or no role in helping government agencies and private-sector 
organizations develop terrorism preparedness plans. So plans are based, instead, 
on planners’ assumptions about what the public cares about and how people will 
behave. 
 The problem with these assumptions is that they may not be right. Planners 
often base their assumptions of public behavior on how people have responded 
to emergencies in the past. But the nation hasn’t had any prior experience with 
some kinds of terrorist weapons, like dirty bombs. When disease outbreaks, like 
smallpox, last occurred, the population and social environment in the United 
States were very diﬀerent. Although the nation’s experience with natural disasters is 
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clearly relevant, these emergencies diﬀer in important ways from intentional attacks with 
unconventional weapons. 
Disagreement among planners is another source of uncertainty. Not infrequently, planners 
have conﬂicting opinions about how the public will respond to an emergency situation. 
When predictions of public behavior diﬀer, on which assumption should plans be based? 
Of even greater concern, planners’ assumptions about the public have been wrong in 
the past, with serious consequences. There are numerous examples in the literature of 
people not responding as planners expected.2-10 Moreover, emergency plans based on 
misconceptions of how people react can create more diﬃculties than they solve.4,10 Most 
recently (and of direct relevance to terrorism planning), planners failed to anticipate the 
behavior of health care workers in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
Smallpox Vaccination Program. As a result, 4 months after successful completion of the 
program had been anticipated, only 8.5% of the targeted 440,000 health care workers 
actually had been vaccinated.11-14
Mistakes happen, but the stakes for the nation will be very high if the terrorism 
preparedness plans now being developed are not based on accurate assumptions about the 
public. In the event of an attack, responders will have a limited window of opportunity 
to get things right. If plans fail to address the issues that are important to the American 
public and if the public does not follow protective instructions, a large number of people 
will be unnecessarily harmed. 
Fortunately, however, planners don’t have to guess what the public cares about or would 
do in these kinds of crisis situations. Recognizing the importance of basing plans on the 
most accurate information possible, leaders involved in terrorism preparedness have been 
encouraging planners to obtain information from the public directly.4,6,13,15-20 As Julie 
Gerberding, Director of the CDC, said in a July 2002 interview:  “…we can’t sit in an 
ivory tower and speculate about what people need or want or should know. We have to go 
out and ﬁnd out.”21 (p. 17) 
This is exactly what the Redeﬁning Readiness Study has done. To enable planners to test 
their assumptions and develop more behaviorally realistic plans, we went to the American 
people themselves to ﬁnd out what terrorism planning looks like through their eyes. 
 3 Redeﬁning Readiness
Preliminary work for the study included in-depth conversations with governmental and 
private sector planners and an extensive review of the literature to identify the critical 
assumptions about the public on which current plans are based. We also engaged a broad 
spectrum of community residents around the country in group discussions to identify a 
frame of reference for thinking about terrorism preparedness planning that is meaningful 
to the general public. Incorporating what we learned, we designed and ﬁelded a telephone 
survey of 2,545 randomly selected adult residents of households in the continental United 
States to ﬁnd out: 
how people believe they would react to protective instructions in two speciﬁc 
terrorist attack situations;
why they would behave that way; and
what they think about terrorism planning activities.
The ﬁndings of the Redeﬁning Readiness Study, presented below, document the value 
of letting the American people speak for themselves. The study uncovers striking 
diﬀerences in the way planners and the public think about these issues — diﬀerences that 
could seriously undermine the eﬀectiveness of current plans. The public’s perspectives 
suggest practical ways of reﬁning plans that would make it much easier for people to 
take protective actions in these kinds of emergency situations. Going further, the study 
highlights the substantial interest of the American people in participating in community 
and organizational preparedness planning and lays a strong foundation for engaging the 





 5 Redeﬁning Readiness
Study Components
S
ince the study’s ﬁndings are based on information from multiple sources, 
we begin by brieﬂy describing how that information was obtained. More 
detailed information about the methods used in the study can be found at 
the end of this report. 
In the fall of 2003, we engaged in conﬁdential telephone conversations with 
government and private-sector planners who are responsible for terrorism and 
emergency preparedness in four representative communities around the country. 
The sites we selected include urban, suburban, and rural communities located in 
the Northwest, Midwest, Atlantic, and Southeast regions of the United States. 
To learn about planning in each community, we spoke with the people who are 
responsible for community-wide emergency preparedness, state and local planning 
funded by federal terrorism preparedness grants, emergency planning for the local 
school district(s), and emergency planning for a major community employer. To 
supplement what we learned in these conversations, we spoke with key informants 
in federal agencies, national associations, and academic institutions involved in 
terrorism preparedness planning. In addition, we reviewed the available literature 
related to local and national planning eﬀorts.
Also in the fall of 2003, we engaged community residents around the country in 
14 group discussions. To make sure we would hear a broad range of perspectives, 
we conducted discussions in urban, suburban, and rural communities; 
communities that do and do not routinely experience natural disasters; and 
communities that had and had not directly experienced the 9/11 attacks. 
Participants involved men and women spanning a broad age range, living in 
households with and without children, and encompassing diverse racial, ethnic, 
socioeconomic, educational, and occupational backgrounds. Some discussions 
intentionally involved people from a single racial or ethnic group, and a Spanish 
translator participated in all of the discussions with Hispanic residents.
In the late winter and spring of 2004 we obtained quantitative information from 
the American public through a random digit dial telephone survey. The survey was 
designed to provide reliable and comparable information about the perspectives of 
people from diﬀerent racial and ethnic backgrounds, socioeconomic groups, and 
geographic areas in the continental United States. We conducted several rounds of 
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cognitive interviews to develop a 25-minute questionnaire that would be clear, relevant, 
and uniformly interpreted by a broad range of people. To capture perspectives that would 
otherwise be under-represented, the survey oversampled African Americans and people in 
the cities that experienced the 9/11 attacks (New York City and Washington, D.C.). The 
survey was ﬁelded in English and Spanish by the Survey Research Center at the Institute 
for Social Research at the University of Michigan. Their highly trained interviewers 
completed 2,545 interviews and achieved an excellent response rate. 
Both the group discussions and telephone survey were designed to allow community 
residents to think about terrorism preparedness planning in their own frame of reference 
— unlike traditional focus groups and public opinion polls, in which people are asked 
to provide their views about issues framed by experts. Since it is very diﬃcult for people 
to think about terrorist attacks in the abstract, both the group discussions and telephone 
survey used scenarios to put participants in speciﬁc smallpox and dirty bomb situations 
at a place and time they would be likely to hear about the attack and be told what to do. 
The scenarios also provided participants with basic information that they would either be 
told at the time or readily ﬁnd out. The scenarios, survey questions, and weighted national 
responses for each of the survey questions can be found in the Appendix to this report.
 7 Redeﬁning Readiness
Study Findings
B
elow, we present the ﬁndings of the Redeﬁning Readiness Study, providing 
quantitative data from the telephone survey in the context of information 
obtained from our conversations with planners, review of the literature, 
and group discussions with community residents. The ﬁndings explore the 
American public’s reactions to two speciﬁc kinds of terrorist attacks — a smallpox 
outbreak and the explosion of a dirty bomb — as well as their perceptions about 
terrorism preparedness planning activities. 
PUBLIC REACTIONS TO A SMALLPOX OUTBREAK 
Although there is no consensus about the best way to protect the population in 
the event of a terrorist-initiated smallpox outbreak, federal funding has focused 
primarily on preparations for large-scale vaccination. Substantial eﬀorts have been 
made to vaccinate health care workers in advance.14 To protect the general public 
if an outbreak occurs, planners at state and local levels are developing strategies 
for quickly getting the vaccine from the national stockpile to key locations around 
the country and setting up clinics in schools and other places that can triage and 
vaccinate large numbers of people within a few days.20,22-27  
The survey scenario explores how the public would react to instructions to go to 
such a site to be vaccinated if some residents in their community and people in 
other parts of the country became sick with smallpox after having been exposed 
to the virus at a major airport. To achieve large-scale vaccination in a short time 
frame, the American people would need to follow these instructions. 
Our conversations with state and local planners indicate that most planners expect 
the public to behave in that way. In fact, many plans explicitly address crowd 
control because planners expect people to ﬂood the vaccination sites when they 
hear about a smallpox outbreak. 
What do the American people believe they would do in this 
situation? 
Most people (57% of the population) would not automatically follow 
instructions to go to the vaccination site. 
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As Figure 1 illustrates, only 24% of the American population say they would rush to 
the vaccination site; another 19% say they would go later when it is most convenient 
for them. More than half of the population (57%) would not automatically follow 
instructions, primarily because they would need more information or advice to decide 
what to do.
Although the study uses a hypothetical scenario, our ﬁndings need to be taken seriously 
because they are consistent with the actual behavior of health care workers in the CDC 
Smallpox Vaccination Program. If 57% of the American people were reluctant to 
follow oﬃcial instructions in an actual smallpox outbreak, the protection of large-scale 
vaccination might not be achieved, even if planners worked out all of the challenging 
logistics involved in dispensing the vaccine. 
Why would so many people be reluctant to follow instructions in the 
smallpox outbreak? 
As we discuss in more detail below, the study identiﬁes four reasons for people’s reluctance 
to follow instructions to go to the vaccination site:
lack of worry about catching smallpox in this situation;
serious worries about what government oﬃcials would say or do; 
•
•
Figure 1 – Public Cooperation in the Smallpox Outbreak 
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Many of the planners we interviewed think the public would be extremely or very worried 
about catching smallpox if an outbreak occurred. As Figure 2 illustrates, 31% of the 
American public say they would have this level of concern. Yet although the scenario 
included information about the dangers and contagiousness of smallpox, at least as many 
people — 36% — say they wouldn’t be worried at all or would be only slightly worried 
about catching smallpox in this situation. Th e hypothetical nature of the smallpox 
scenario does not appear to account for their lack of worry since respondents expressed 
considerably more concern about other issues in the survey. 
Of the people who say they wouldn’t be worried about catching smallpox, 42% believe the 
outbreak would not pose much of a danger to them, usually because they have a lifestyle 
that doesn’t bring them into contact with many other people. A smaller proportion (19%) 
say they wouldn’t be worried because they have already been vaccinated for smallpox. 
Since this belief is not correlated with age, it is likely that some of the people who think 
serious worries about the vaccine; and
conﬂ icting worries about catching smallpox and getting sick from the vaccine.
One-third of the American population (36%) say they wouldn’t be worried 
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they have been vaccinated are misinformed. Quite a few of the community residents in 
our group discussions were confused about whether they had previously been vaccinated 
for smallpox, and other surveys have documented that some Americans are misinformed 
about their vaccination status.15,28
Two-ﬁfths of the American population (41%) would be extremely or 
very concerned about what government oﬃcials would say or do in this 
situation. This is larger than the proportion of people who would be 
extremely or very worried about catching smallpox. 
Planners recognize that they need the public’s trust in order to vaccinate the population 
rapidly in the event of a smallpox outbreak.20,29 While the public did trust the instructions 
they were given by oﬃcials during the 1947 smallpox outbreak in New York City, our 
study suggests that many Americans would not be so conﬁdent today.10
As Figure 3 (next page) illustrates, 35% of the American population say they would be 
extremely or very worried that government oﬃcials might tell them to do something 
that is not the best thing for them to do in the smallpox situation (65% of the 
population would be moderately to extremely worried about this). This worry has 
practical implications because it would make 26% of the population afraid to go to the 
vaccination site. In both the survey and group discussions with community residents, 
people’s speciﬁc concerns are that government oﬃcials: (1) would not be completely 
truthful (i.e., they would intentionally mislead the public, lie to the public, manipulate 
people, or blow things out of proportion in order to further their own agenda); (2) 
wouldn’t know what to do (i.e., they would be uninformed, misinformed, or act too 
hastily without having all the facts); or (3) wouldn’t care about people like “me” (i.e., the 
oﬃcials would look out for themselves, people like themselves, or the majority rather than 
the interests of minority groups or individuals). 
Figure 3 also shows that 16% of the American population believe there is a very high or 
high chance that government oﬃcials in the United States would decide to do something 
in this situation that they know would harm them or people like them in some way (42% 
of the population believe there is a moderate to very high chance of this happening). Here, 
people are concerned that government oﬃcials would knowingly: (1) conceal or withhold 
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information from the public; (2) lie or provide false information to the public (e.g., about 
the safety of the vaccine); (3) experiment on people; or (4) look after their own interests 
— or the interests of wealthy Caucasian Americans — at the expense of others.
Two-ﬁfths of the American population (41%) would be seriously worried about one or 
both of these issues. As Figure 3 illustrates, that proportion is signiﬁcantly greater than the 
31% of the population who would be extremely or very worried about catching smallpox 
in this situation. Serious concern about what oﬃcials would say or do in the smallpox 
situation is even more prevalent among people who are Hispanic (61%), African-
American (57%), foreign-born (55%); have a low income (57%); lack health insurance 
coverage for everyone in the household (56%), live in New York City (55%), or have not 
attended college (51%). 
Looking at the issue from the other perspective, only 26% of the American population 
have a lot of trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions. These are people who say they would 
be not at all or only slightly worried about what government oﬃcials would tell them 
to do in this situation and who believe there is no chance or only a slight chance that 
government oﬃcials would decide to do something in this situation that they know would 
harm them. Having a lot of trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions is more common 
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Figure 4 – Concerns About the Smallpox Vaccine
among people who have high incomes (40%), have attended graduate school (35%), are 
male (30%), Caucasian (28%), or have full household health insurance coverage (28%). 
Three-ﬁfths of the American population (61%) would have serious worries 
about the vaccine. That is twice as many people as would be seriously 
worried about catching smallpox in this situation.
The community residents who participated in the group discussions we held around the 
country expressed three distinct concerns about the smallpox vaccine. To ﬁnd out how 
prevalent these concerns are, we asked the survey respondents about them. As Figure 4 
shows, 61% of the American people say they would be extremely or very worried about 
one or more of the three vaccine issues. That is a much greater proportion than the 31% of 
the population who say they would be extremely or very worried about catching smallpox 
in this situation.
Looking at the ﬁrst two vaccine issues in Figure 4, we see that 26% of the American 
population would be extremely or very worried that getting the smallpox vaccine would 
make them or someone else in their household sick (57% would be moderately to 
extremely worried about this). The same proportion (27%) would be extremely or very 
� �� �� �� �� �� �� �� ���
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worried that, if they got the vaccine, they might come into contact with the kinds of 
people who shouldn’t be exposed to anyone who recently got the vaccine (55% would be 
moderately to extremely worried about this). Two-ﬁfths of the population (38%) would 
be extremely or very worried about one or both of these vaccine issues, and these concerns 
would make one-ﬁfth of the American people afraid to go to the vaccination site.
From what is known about the smallpox vaccine, the public’s concerns about these 
two vaccine issues appear to be well-founded. In fact, concerns about the vaccine’s side 
eﬀects were a major reason that so few health care workers agreed to be vaccinated 
prophylactically in the CDC Smallpox Vaccination Program.13,14,30
Smallpox vaccine can protect people from getting sick from smallpox if they are vaccinated 
before being exposed to the smallpox (variola) virus or within a few days after exposure. 
Nonetheless, the smallpox vaccine, made with live vaccinia virus, is the least safe of all 
available vaccines today, and substantially more Americans are at high risk for developing 
serious adverse reactions to the vaccine today than 40 years ago when data about the 
safety of the vaccine were collected.11,13,31 Currently, it is estimated that about 20% of 
the people in this country are at risk of developing serious illness or even death from the 
vaccine — either from being vaccinated themselves or from accidentally coming in contact 
with someone who has recently been vaccinated.32-33 People who are vaccinated may 
inadvertently infect other people with the vaccinia virus until their scab falls oﬀ, which 
may take weeks.34-35
Information about the particular kinds of people who are at risk for developing serious 
complications from the smallpox vaccine has been widely publicized. In the event of 
an outbreak, people would be screened to identify potential contraindications.23,36 
High-risk people include pregnant women; babies under one year old; people with 
immune system problems like HIV/AIDS, leukemia, lymphoma, organ transplant, or 
agammaglobulinemia; people with autoimmune system problems like lupus; people 
currently taking chemotherapy agents or undergoing radiation treatment for cancer; 
people taking medicines like steroids (such as prednisone) or organ transplant medicines; 
people who have eczema (atopic dermatitis) or who have had this skin condition in the 
past; people with other skin problems like burns, impetigo, contact dermatitis, or herpes 
zoster; and people who are allergic to certain antibiotics (polymixin B, streptomycin, 
chlortetracycline, neomycin).23,34
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Repeatedly, community residents in the group discussions we conducted wanted to 
know what would be done to protect the people who are at risk of developing serious 
complications from the vaccine. The questions they raised highlight the need for such 
strategies. What if they went to the vaccination site, exposing themselves to lots of other 
people and potentially to smallpox, and then found out they have a contraindication to 
getting the vaccine?  What if someone else in their household has one of these conditions?  
What if they got the vaccine and then, accidentally, came in contact with such a person?  
What if they were pregnant, or were infected with HIV/AIDS, and didn’t know it?
Now, let’s turn attention to the third vaccine issue in Figure 4. Under current plans, the 
smallpox vaccine would only be available to the public under an Investigational New Drug 
protocol, so people would have to give their informed consent before being vaccinated.23   
Figure 4 shows how the American people would respond in such a situation. Half of the 
population (48%) — and two-thirds of African Americans (68%) —would be extremely 
or very worried if, when they went to get vaccinated, they were asked to sign a piece 
of paper saying that the smallpox vaccine is an investigational drug that has not been 
completely tested (78% of the population would be moderately to extremely worried 
about this). Of note, more people would be seriously worried about the investigational 
status of the vaccine than about any other aspect of the smallpox situation and 32% of 
the population say this worry would make them decide not to get the vaccine, even if 
they were at the vaccination site already. The history of the Tuskegee syphilis study and 
other past events make the investigational status of the vaccine particularly worrisome to 
African Americans.
Many people say they would have serious worries about getting the vaccine 
and about catching smallpox, which puts them in a very diﬃcult decision-
making predicament. 
As we mentioned earlier, 31% of the American people say they would be extremely or very 
worried about catching smallpox in this situation. Figure 5 (next page) shows that three- 
quarters of these people (74%) would also be extremely or very worried about one or more 
issues related to the vaccine. Speciﬁcally, 49% would be extremely or very worried about 
getting sick from the vaccine, 49% would be extremely or very worried about coming into 
contact with vulnerable people after being vaccinated, and 35% would be extremely or 
very worried about the investigational status of the vaccine. 
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We know from the survey and our group discussions with community residents that most 
of the people who would be seriously worried about the vaccine and about catching 
smallpox are not nonspeciﬁc worriers. Nonspeciﬁc worriers (i.e., the people who respond 
“extremely or very worried” to almost all of the “worry questions” in the survey) make up 
only 5% of the population. The vast majority of the people with serious worries about 
both the vaccine and smallpox are facing a very diﬃcult and speciﬁc trade-oﬀ.
How would the conﬂicting worries and trade-oﬀs that people face 
aﬀect their behavior in the smallpox situation?
When people have serious worries about the smallpox vaccine, their level 
of cooperation is very low, even if they have beliefs or concerns that would 
otherwise motivate them to go to the vaccination site. 
People can be deﬁned as being cooperative in the smallpox outbreak if they would 
follow instructions to go to the vaccination site (either by going immediately or by 
going later, when it is most convenient for them). As a baseline for making comparisons 
about cooperation, consider people who say they would not have a lot of trust in oﬃcial 
Figure 5 – Conﬂicting Worries in the Smallpox Outbreak
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Figure 6 – How Conﬂicting Worries Aﬀect Behavior
instructions in this situation, would not be extremely or very worried about catching 
smallpox, and would not be extremely or very worried about getting sick from the vaccine. 
























As Figure 6 illustrates, cooperation is very low (34%) among the people in this group. 
Now consider the people who are just like the baseline group with one exception: 
they would have a lot of trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions. Figure 6 shows that 
the cooperation rate for this group is 50% (47% higher than baseline), which is not 
surprising since people who have a lot of trust in what oﬃcials say and do are likely to be 
more conﬁdent about following instructions to go to the vaccination site. This boost in 
cooperation is completely oﬀset by serious worries about the vaccine, however. Among 
people who say they would have a lot of trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions and 
would be extremely or very worried about getting sick from the vaccine, cooperation is 
only 38% (not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than baseline). 
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Being seriously worried about catching smallpox is also associated with a higher 
cooperation rate, which makes sense since the vaccine can protect people from getting sick 
from smallpox. As Figure 6 illustrates, cooperation is 91% higher than baseline (65%) 
among people who say they would be extremely or very worried about catching smallpox 
in this situation but are otherwise just like the baseline group. But again, this boost in 
cooperation is completely oﬀset by serious worries about the vaccine. Among people 
who say they would be extremely or very worried about catching smallpox and would be 
extremely or very worried about getting sick from the vaccine, cooperation is only 40% 
(not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than baseline). 
These comparisons demonstrate that when people have serious worries about the vaccine, 
that worry is like a trump card — it wins out over factors that would otherwise have 
a positive inﬂuence on cooperation. The take-home message from these ﬁndings is 
straightforward. If planners want the public to cooperate with instructions to go to a 
vaccination site in the event of a smallpox outbreak, they will have to develop plans that 
eﬀectively address the public’s concerns about the vaccine. 
Cooperation in the smallpox outbreak is correlated more strongly with 
what people are concerned about than with where they live or who they are. 
We used a special kind of analysis, multivariate logistic regression, to look at a broad 
range of factors that could potentially inﬂuence whether people follow instructions in 
the smallpox outbreak. This analysis, which distinguishes factors that are signiﬁcantly 
associated with people’s cooperation (p<0.05) from those that are not, provides further 
documentation of the link between people’s conﬂicting worries and their behavior.
We found that people’s cooperation is positively correlated with: 
being extremely or very worried about catching smallpox (odds ratio = 3.3);
having a lot of trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions (odds ratio = 1.74);
being foreign-born (odds ratio = 1.56); and
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Their cooperation is negatively correlated with: 
having conﬂicting worries about catching smallpox and getting sick from the 
vaccine (i.e., being both extremely or very worried about getting sick from the 
vaccine and extremely or very worried about catching smallpox) (odds ratio = 
0.35);
being extremely or very worried about the vaccine being an investigational 
drug (odds ratio = .58);
wanting to talk directly with someone to decide what to do (odds ratio = .60);
having a high income (odds ratio = .40);
being Hispanic (odds ratio = 0.53); and
being female (odds ratio = 0.70).
The odds ratios in the analysis indicate how much inﬂuence each factor has on its own. 
An odds ratio of 3, for example, means that, taking everything else into account, people 
are three times more likely to cooperate in the smallpox situation if they have that 
characteristic than if they do not. An odds ratio of 0.33, for example, means that, taking 
everything else into account, people are one-third as likely to cooperate if they have that 
characteristic than if they do not. 
Taking the factors above into account, people’s cooperation in the smallpox scenario is not 
signiﬁcantly correlated with their cooperation in the dirty bomb scenario (discussed later 
in this report). It is also not signiﬁcantly correlated with other sociodemographic factors 
(age, race, education, children, health insurance coverage); where people live  (i.e., in New 
York City, Washington, D.C., or the rest of the continental United States); their responses 
to other questions related to the smallpox scenario (i.e., whether they would try to avoid 
other people in this situation; whether they would be more or less worried by having 
options in this situation); or other constructs in our analysis (people’s awareness of plans, 
conﬁdence in plans, knowledge level [either related solely to information in the smallpox 
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These are good ﬁndings for planners. What we have learned about cooperation in the 
smallpox outbreak is generalizable to all parts of the country. Moreover, although some 
sociodemographic factors are signiﬁcant on their own, cooperation is correlated most 
strongly with issues that people care about and that planners can do something about. 
Our ﬁndings suggest that planners could boost initial cooperation substantially by 
developing plans that explicitly address the issues we have identiﬁed, paying particular 
attention to the population groups that are more likely to care about some of these issues. 
Such plans would entail: (1) taking precautions to protect the large number of unexposed 
people who would be at risk of developing serious complications from the smallpox 
vaccine; (2) actively involving the public — especially the African-American community 
— in overseeing the development and testing of investigational vaccines; (3) working 
to build the public’s trust in what government oﬃcials would say and do in this kind 
of situation (especially among the population groups least likely to have this trust); (4) 
providing people with accurate information to dispel unwarranted lack of concern about 
catching smallpox in the event of an outbreak; and (5) providing the public with decision-
making support.
What kind of decision-making support would be most helpful to the 
American public? 
The vast majority of the American people (87% of the population) say they 
would want to talk directly with someone who can give them information 
or advice to help them decide what to do in this situation. 
Although we live in an electronic age and a lot of information is available through the 
Internet, obtaining information or advice from another human being appears to be 
critically important to the American public in this situation. Both the survey and our 
discussions with community residents around the country document that people are 
looking for decision-making support, not just facts. People want to talk to someone to 
(1) conﬁrm what they are hearing from government oﬃcials or through the media, (2) get 
additional information to answer their questions, and (3) help them resolve diﬃcult trade-
oﬀs so they can make the best decisions for themselves and their families. 
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Figure 7 – Whom People Want To Talk To
Participants in the group discussions emphasized that they wanted to be able to talk to 
someone beforehand, not just during an attack. Many people have diﬃcult decisions to 
make, and a crisis situation is not the best time to make such decisions. Moreover, the 
person they would most want to talk to would likely be overwhelmed if an outbreak 
occurred.
When it comes to decision-making support, expertise about smallpox is 
important, but not suﬃcient. Most people want to talk to someone who has 
their best interests at heart. 
The characteristics people are seeking in the person they want to talk to are presented in 
Figure 7. Of note, almost as many people say it would be extremely or very important 
that the person be someone who wants what is best for them (88%) as that the person 
be someone who knows a lot about smallpox (94%). Fewer — but still over half the 
population — want to talk to someone who already knows their medical history (64%) or 
whom they know well (54%). Our ﬁnding that people are seeking guidance from someone 
who has more than scientiﬁc expertise is consistent with the work of other investigators.37 
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Two-thirds (63%) of the people who would want to talk directly with someone say that 
they know a person they could contact who has all of the characteristics they feel are 
important. People are more likely not to know someone with the characteristics they seek 
if they are Hispanic, live in households without full health insurance coverage, are under 
40, are foreign-born, are male, or have young children.
For free telephone support from a trained person, considerably more people 
would ﬁnd it extremely or very helpful to talk with someone who they 
know wants what is best for them than to talk with someone they don’t 
know who works for their local government.
In our conversations with planners, many said they were considering setting up 1-800 
numbers that the public could call in the event of a smallpox outbreak. In the survey, 
we asked people how helpful two telephone support options would be. We found that 
community-organized telephone support networks would be helpful even to people 
who said they already know someone they could contact for information or advice. As 
we learned in the group discussions with community residents, such support is valuable 
because people realize how hard it would be to get in touch with the person they have in 
mind during a crisis, and many people want to get information or advice from multiple 
sources.
The value of community-organized telephone support depends on how it is structured, 
however. Figure 8 (next page) shows that 58% of the American people would ﬁnd it 
extremely or very helpful if they could talk by telephone at no cost with someone they 
don’t know, who works for their local government, and who has been specially trained 
by the health department to give people information and advice about what to do in this 
situation. However, considerably more people (84% of the population) say they would 
ﬁnd it extremely or very helpful to talk with someone they know well, who they are sure 
wants what is best for them, and who has been specially trained in advance to give people 
information and advice about what to do in this situation. This ﬁnding suggests that 
government-run telephone networks need to be supplemented by a more community-
embedded telephone support capacity. 
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Figure 8 – Preferences for Free Telephone Support
Almost everyone (94% of the American population) wants someone they 
know well and who wants what is best for them to be trained in advance to 
give other people information and advice in this situation.
In the group discussions, community residents emphasized that unless the person they 
would want to talk to received advance training, that person would probably not be able to 
provide them with accurate information or constructive decision-making support.
As data from the survey show (Figure 9, next page), most people want either their doctor 
or other health care practitioner to receive this training, which should be feasible from 
a planning perspective. In the group discussions, community residents said that health 
professionals need training because many do not currently have suﬃcient expertise about 
smallpox or the skills to help their patients reconcile the situation’s diﬃcult trade-oﬀs. 
Training health practitioners to provide decision-making support would not be suﬃcient 
to meet the public’s needs, however. In the survey, people who lack full household 
health insurance coverage, who are Hispanic, African-American, under 40 years of age, 
low-income, or who have not attended college were less likely to identify a health care 
practitioner for training. Moreover, almost a third of the population want a close friend or 
family member to be trained. This response is even more common among people who are 
African-American, Hispanic, or who have not attended college. While it probably would 
not be practical to implement such extensive training, our ﬁndings suggest that planners 
 23 Redeﬁning Readiness
need to work closely with members of these population groups to identify a cadre of 
people whom they trust and to provide these people with advance training. 
What are the American people’s views about targeted vaccination? 
Planners have been engaging in heated discussions about the relative beneﬁts of mass 
vaccination and ring vaccination in dealing with a terrorist-initiated smallpox outbreak, 
and currently local jurisdictions vary considerably in whom they plan to vaccinate and 
when.11,38 While many factors have been considered in models comparing the relative 
beneﬁts of mass and ring vaccination, thus far the public’s views have neither been sought 
nor incorporated. In the survey, we posed the question to the American people directly.
We found that almost everyone (94% of the population) supports providing the vaccine 
right away to people who are known to be exposed to the smallpox virus even if it means 
slowing down vaccinating people who have not yet been exposed. Most of these people 
(86% of the population) support this approach strongly. Only 8% oppose this strategy; 
4% oppose it strongly.
Figure 9 – Whom the Public Wants to be Trained to Provide Decision-Making Support
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Do the American people see vaccination as the only means of 
protecting themselves in the event of a smallpox outbreak?  
Although current plans are focusing almost exclusively on vaccination to 
protect the public in a smallpox outbreak, two-thirds of the American 
population (65%) say they would engage in protective isolation.
As a recent study in California revealed, local planners have diﬀerent views about whether 
healthy people should stay at home or go about their normal activities during a smallpox 
outbreak.38 Data from our survey show that 65% of the American population would try to 
avoid being in the same place with other people they don’t know in this situation. Most of 
these people (84%) would try to avoid others to reduce their chances of getting smallpox. 
Thinking beyond their own welfare, 20% would try to avoid others to reduce their 
chances of giving smallpox to someone else, and 8% would do so to reduce the chances 
of inadvertently coming in contact with people who could get sick from being exposed to 
someone who recently got the vaccine. 
As the survey and our discussions with community residents highlight, going to a public 
vaccination site violates people’s inclination toward protective isolation. Two-ﬁfths of 
the population (38%) say they would be afraid of catching smallpox from other people 
at the vaccination site. Concerns about accidentally coming into contact with someone 
who shouldn’t be exposed to anyone who recently got the vaccine would make 21% 
of the population afraid to go to the vaccination site. These are important issues for 
the public, but current plans do not seem to take them into account. The planners we 
interviewed and the plans we reviewed frequently referred to public sites as venues for 
triage (the identiﬁcation of people who have been exposed to smallpox) and screening (the 
identiﬁcation of unexposed people who are at high risk for developing complications from 
the vaccine).23,39  
The anxiety level of half of the American population (48%) would be 
reduced if the oﬃcials managing the smallpox outbreak gave them a choice 
of protective actions. Only 13% of the population would be more worried 
by having options. 
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The planners we interviewed were very interested in learning what they could do to reduce 
people’s anxiety levels and prevent panic in the event of a smallpox outbreak. Since quite a 
few of the community residents in our group discussions said that panic could be averted 
by giving the public a choice of actions, and since that view has also been endorsed by 
some experts in emergency preparedness planning,40 we included a question about options 
in the survey. 
Half of the population (48%) say they would be less worried if, instead of telling everyone 
to go to a particular vaccination site to get the smallpox vaccine, oﬃcials oﬀered people 
several diﬀerent ways they could get the vaccine and told them about other ways they 
could protect themselves in this situation. We know from the group discussions we held 
with community residents around the country that many people would prefer to be 
vaccinated by their own health care practitioner or at home. 
Two-ﬁfths of the population (39%) say that having options would not aﬀect how worried 
they would be. Only 13% say they would be more worried if they were oﬀered options. 
Having options is more likely to increase worry among people who are foreign-born, 
African-American, Hispanic, live in New York City, have not attended college, or have 
a low income. Not surprisingly, people who are nonspeciﬁc worriers (i.e., the 5% of the 
population who respond “extremely or very worried” to almost all of the “worry questions” 
in the survey) are also more likely to become more worried by having options. 
What would smallpox plans look like if they incorporated the public’s 
perspectives? 
Planners have been focusing a lot of attention on public education and risk 
communication, and they have taken important steps to make information about 
smallpox and the vaccine available to the public and to encourage the American people to 
follow instructions should an outbreak occur.25,36,41-43 Our study suggests that these eﬀorts 
will not be suﬃcient to garner the public’s timely cooperation, however. 
As the Working Group on Governance Dilemmas in Bioterrorism Response has said, 
members of the public are “decision-makers who are interested in determining the nature 
of the danger and acting to reduce the chance of illness for themselves and loved ones.”20 
(p. 31) The Redeﬁning Readiness Study identiﬁes some of the speciﬁc and diﬃcult decisions 
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that many people would face in this situation. It shows the particular kind of decision-
making support that people would like to have — both now and during an outbreak. 
Moreover, it suggests practical steps that planners can take to reduce the conﬂicts people 
currently face in choosing the best protective action. A key element of those steps is 
to develop plans that explicitly protect everyone at risk: the people who are at risk of 
developing serious complications from the vaccine as well as those who are at risk of 
contracting smallpox. 
Below, we illustrate what plans to deal with a smallpox outbreak might look like if they 
incorporated the public’s perspectives, focusing on actions that would need to be taken 
prior to an outbreak, at the ﬁrst hint of an outbreak, and when an outbreak is conﬁrmed. 
While this illustration deals speciﬁcally with smallpox, it contains strategies that could be 
useful in other situations, such as managing an outbreak of pandemic inﬂuenza or SARS 
or enhancing public cooperation with routine vaccinations.
Smallpox Planning Through the Eyes of the Public
Prior to an Outbreak
(1) Identify people who are and are not at high risk for developing serious 
complications from the smallpox vaccine and encourage all members of the 
public to know their vaccine risk status. Building on existing materials, develop 
easy-to-use questionnaires that help individuals assess their risk in the context of 
their household, identifying potential contraindications to the vaccine both for 
them and for the other people who would be exposed to the vaccine if they got 
it. Disseminate and promote the use of these questionnaires in a broad array of 
venues, including medical practices, worksites, schools, churches, and community-
based organizations. Using these and other strategies, enable everyone, including 
people in marginalized groups, to know their vaccine risk status — well before they 
would ever be asked to go to a site to be vaccinated. 
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(2) Train health practitioners and other people to provide community 
residents with information about smallpox and the vaccine and to support 
their decision making before and during an outbreak. Training people from 
diverse population groups and community-based organizations will develop 
the capacity to provide the American public with accurate information 
about the trade-oﬀs they would face, from people they trust, in a context 
that supports individualized decision making. Extend emergency phone 
bank systems to relay critical information to these trained people during an 
outbreak and, if possible, to allow many of them to ﬁeld toll-free calls from 
the public in their homes.
(3) Meaningfully involve community leaders — particularly among the 
African-American population — in overseeing the development and testing 
of smallpox (and other) vaccines. Building on the suggestions of others, 
establish an objective, citizen-majority National Vaccine Safety Board.44 
Engage the general public in frank discussions about the safety and testing of 
vaccines and what is reasonable to expect in terms of investigational status. 
Consider using a diﬀerent term to refer to an investigational vaccine (e.g., 
“vaccine approved for emergency use only”). 
(4) Build the public’s trust in what government oﬃcials would say and 
do in this kind of situation, especially among community residents who 
are African-American, Hispanic, foreign-born, low-income, lack health 
insurance coverage, and have limited education. As suggested by others, 
encourage oﬃcials to engage in open and honest communication with the 
public and to pay special attention to assuring that policies for dealing with 
emergency situations are not discriminatory.10,19,20,25,29   Even more important, 
encourage oﬃcials to listen to the American people directly and — as we are 
illustrating here — to develop plans and policies that explicitly address the 
public’s concerns. 
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At the First Hint of an Outbreak
(1) Inform the public about the possibility of a smallpox outbreak as soon as 
clinical suspicion is high. 
(2) Take advantage of people’s natural inclination to try to avoid others in this 
situation and declare a “snow day” (i.e., have people stay home; close schools and 
nonessential businesses). This action will not only make sense to the public, it will 
also facilitate containment and case-ﬁnding. 
(3) Tell people to call a special number for evaluation and possible treatment if they 
have symptoms of smallpox (describe what those symptoms are) or were at certain 
places at certain times (i.e., where they might have been exposed to smallpox). 
When an Outbreak is Conﬁrmed
(1) Provide the vaccine ﬁrst to people who are known to have been exposed to the 
smallpox virus and to people providing essential community services who do not 
have any contraindications to the vaccine. Use multiple trusted sources to inform all 
population groups about the symptoms of smallpox and the times and places where 
people could have been exposed. Tell anyone who has symptoms or who thinks they 
might have been exposed to stay home and call a special number. Provide medical 
care and vaccination through home visits by vaccinated health care workers. 
(2) Implement special strategies to protect non-exposed people who are at risk of 
developing serious complications from the smallpox vaccine.
Tell these people to stay home and call a special number. Make plans to 
assure that people in high-risk households receive needed food, medications, 
and supplies until the outbreak is under control. If a person who needs to 
leave the house (such as a wage earner) does not have contraindications to 
getting the vaccine but other members of her household are at risk, identify 
other places where that person could stay after being vaccinated until the 
vaccination site is healed.
•
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Enable people who do not already know their vaccination risk status to 
determine what it is without going to a vaccination site. Publicize the 
conditions that put people at risk for developing serious complications 
from the vaccine. Provide a hotline that people can call to go through a 
questionnaire that helps them determine whether they or any other member 
of their household has a potential contraindication to the vaccine. Publicize 
the numbers of all of the community-based organizations that have these 
questionnaires. People from these organizations will have been trained in 
advance to provide community residents from diﬀerent backgrounds with this 
kind of telephone assistance.
(3) To address the concerns of the rest of the public:
Do not rely on public sites for triage or vaccine risk screening. Take steps 
(as described above) to make sure that people who are potentially infected, 
exposed, or at risk of developing serious complications from the vaccine stay 
home and do not go to any public vaccination site. Make sure the rest of the 
public is aware of this strategy so people won’t worry about being infected or 
harming others when they go to a vaccination site. 
Use multiple trusted sources to get important information to all population 
groups. To decide the best course of protective action for themselves and 
their family, people need accurate information not only about vaccine 
risks, but also about the seriousness of smallpox, when infected people are 
contagious, the post-exposure eﬀectiveness of the vaccine, their likelihood 
of having been vaccinated in the past, the protection aﬀorded by prior 
vaccination, their chances of getting sick from the vaccine if they and other 
household members do not have known contraindications, and provisions for 
compensation if bad reactions to the vaccine occur. It will also be important 
to distinguish smallpox from chickenpox for people from Spanish-speaking 
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Oﬀer people without contraindications multiple options for receiving 
the vaccine, including, if possible, being vaccinated in their own health 
practitioner’s oﬃce. 
Reiterate important points from the pre-event public discussion about the 
testing and investigational status of the vaccine (see above). If informed 
consent is required, do not combine vaccine risk screening with the process 
to obtain informed consent.
Provide the public with telephone decision-making support through 
the cadre of people from diﬀerent population groups and community-
based organizations who have received training in advance (i.e., use 
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PUBLIC REACTIONS TO A DIRTY BOMB EXPLOSION 
A dirty bomb uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material across a 
wide area.42,45-49 The main risk for people who are not at the site of the explosion is the 
inhalation of contaminated dust, which is carried downwind by a radioactive plume. 
The dust, itself, can cause respiratory problems in the people who inhale it. In addition, 
the radioactive material in the dust can raise the risk of cancer in exposed people and 
contaminate the soil and crops on which it falls. Depending on the particular type of 
radioactive material in a dirty bomb, the long-term consequences of the explosion can 
vary greatly.50 
To protect the general public in the event of a dirty bomb explosion, current plans are to 
instruct everyone in the vicinity of the plume to take shelter in an undamaged building 
(i.e., by staying inside such a building if that is where they are at the time, or by going 
inside the nearest undamaged building if they are outside). People would be instructed to 
close all windows and doors, shut down ventilation systems, and stay inside the building 
until oﬃcials say it is safe to leave.36,41,42,45-48  
The survey scenario explores how the American public would react to instructions to stay 
inside a building other than their own home if a dirty bomb exploded a mile from where 
they were and a cloud containing radioactive dust were moving in their direction. Since 
planners are concerned about the possibility of communications problems in this kind 
of emergency, the scenario states that telephone lines are jammed so people are unable 
to reach anyone by phone.27,49 Many of the planners we interviewed thought that a lot 
of people — especially parents of young children — would panic and leave the building 
in this kind of situation. That response would not only expose the people who leave to 
dangerous dust and radiation, but also would make it more diﬃcult for ﬁrst responders to 
get to the scene of the explosion. 
What do the American people believe they would do in this situation? 
Only three-ﬁfths of the American people would cooperate fully with 
instructions to stay inside the building. 
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As Figure 10 illustrates, 68% of the population say they would stay inside the building, 
at least initially. Three-ﬁfths (59%) say they would stay as long as oﬃcials told them, no 
matter how long that would be. One-ﬁfth (20%) say they would need more information 
or advice to decide what to do. Only 11% say they would leave the building immediately. 
Figure 10 – Public Cooperation in the Dirty Bomb Situation
Why would people leave the building immediately or not stay inside 
as long as told?
Many of the people who say they would not cooperate fully in this situation 
would leave the building in order to meet other pressing needs. 
In the survey, 20% of the American people say they would not cooperate fully with oﬃcial 
instructions in this situation (11% would leave the building immediately, and 9% would 
stay initially, but not for as long as they are told). 
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Three-quarters of these people say that they would cooperate fully with the 
instruction to stay in the building if certain conditions were met. If that 
happened, the public’s full cooperation in the dirty bomb situation would 
increase from 59% to 74%.
Figure 11 – Why People Wouldn’t Cooperate Fully in the Dirty Bomb Situation
As Figure 11 shows, many of these people would leave the building because they face 
conﬂicting obligations (i.e., it is more important for them to assure the safety of people 
who are dependent on them than to protect their own safety). Others would leave because 
they face diﬃcult trade-oﬀs (i.e., it is more important to obtain the medications or food 
they need to stay alive than to risk exposure to dust and radiation by leaving the building). 
Of note, a substantial proportion of the people who would not cooperate fully would leave 
the building because they would feel safer elsewhere (usually at home). Only 1% would 
leave because they believe the situation is not dangerous (far fewer than in the smallpox 
scenario).
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As Figure 12 illustrates, an additional 14% of the American population say they would 
stay in the building as long as told if they could communicate with the people they care 
about by telephone or e-mail to tell them they are safe and to ﬁnd out that the people 
they care about are safe. An additional 12% of the population say they would stay if 
they couldn’t communicate with anyone outside their building, but they deﬁnitely knew 
that the people they care about were in places that had prepared in advance to take good 
care of them for at least three days in this kind of situation. An additional 8% of the 
population say they would stay if they knew that the building they were in had made 
plans to keep the people inside fed and safe for at least three days in this kind of situation. 
Overall, an additional 15% of the American population say they would stay if one or more 
of these conditions were met, boosting full cooperation in the dirty bomb situation from 
59% to 74%. 
Figure 12 – Conditions That Would Enable More People to Cooperate Fully in 
the Dirty Bomb Situation
Only 5% of the population would leave even if all three conditions were met. Of note, 
people who live in households with children or other adults do not make up a signiﬁcantly 
larger portion of this group. 
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The conditions that would enable an additional 15% of the American 
population to cooperate fully with instructions to stay inside the building 
are not met now. 
As the ﬁndings in Figure 12 document, Americans place a high priority on their ability 
to communicate with the people they care about during an emergency. In our study, as 
in studies of natural disasters, enabling family members to communicate with each other 
appears to be more important than keeping families together.4 Nonetheless, while quite a 
lot of attention has been paid to assuring that ﬁrst responders can communicate with each 
other in the event of a terrorist attack, we are not aware of any backup plans to assure 
phone and e-mail communication for the general public. 
Figure 12 highlights how important it is for people to know that they and their loved 
ones are in places that have prepared in advance to take good care of them in this kind of 
situation. The survey documents, however, that three-ﬁfths of the American population 
(58%) know only a little or nothing at all about what would actually happen at the place 
they would be. Lack of this knowledge is even more prevalent among people who are 
Hispanic (79%) or live in New York City (70%). A similar proportion (62%) know only 
a little or nothing at all about what would actually happen at the places where the people 
they care about would be. Lack of this knowledge is even more prevalent among people 
who are Hispanic (79%) or African-American (71%). 
The public’s limited awareness of shelter-in-place plans is not surprising, considering the 
broad array of buildings the people in the survey said they would be in and the focus 
of current planning. The dirty bomb scenario takes place on a weekday afternoon when 
respondents say they would be at work sites, shops, malls, schools, day care centers, 
hospitals and clinics, cultural institutions, recreational and entertainment facilities, 
government buildings, apartment buildings, and transportation terminals. From what 
we have been able to ﬁnd out, emergency planners for places like these are primarily 
concentrating on preventing attacks or evacuating people from an on-site ﬁre or explosion. 
We found very few examples of shelter-in-place or safe-haven planning. 
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What else aﬀects people’s cooperation with instructions in the dirty 
bomb situation?
The survey links public cooperation in the dirty bomb situation to two 
other factors that planners can address: the American people’s trust in 
oﬃcial instructions and their conﬁdence in their community’s preparedness 
plans. 
Looking at the population as a whole, we used multivariate logistic regression to look 
at the broad array of factors that could potentially inﬂuence whether people follow 
instructions to stay inside the building they are in for as long as they are told. 
We found that full cooperation is positively correlated with: 
having a lot of trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions (odds ratio = 2.1);
knowing a great deal or a lot about what the managers of the place you are in 
would actually do to meet the needs of the people inside (odds ratio = 1.8);
being female (odds ratio = 1.9); and
living someplace other than New York City (odds ratio = 1.7).
Full cooperation is negatively correlated with: 
not being conﬁdent about preparedness plans (odds ratio = .43);
earning more than a very low income (odds ratio = .38); and
having children under the age of 14 (odds ratio = .66).
Taking the factors above into account, people’s cooperation in the dirty bomb scenario 
is not signiﬁcantly correlated with their cooperation in the smallpox scenario. It is also 
not signiﬁcantly correlated with other sociodemographic factors (i.e., age, race/ethnicity, 
place of birth, education, household size, health insurance coverage); people’s responses 
to other questions related to the dirty bomb scenario (i.e., their concerns about cancer, 
the environment, jobs and businesses, and compensation; their knowledge about what 
managers of the places where the people they care about are would do in this situation); 
or other constructs in our analysis (people’s awareness of community preparedness plans, 
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Our analysis conﬁrms a common assumption of planners that parents of young children 
are less likely to shelter in place than are other people. It also documents a lower level 
of cooperation among people who live in New York City. The comments of participants 
in the group discussions we held in New York City shed light on this ﬁnding. They 
frequently mentioned that many of the people who died in the collapse of the World Trade 
Center had been told to stay inside the building or to go back inside after they had left. 
Although these and other sociodemographic factors are signiﬁcant, the analysis 
demonstrates that cooperation is strongly correlated with factors that planners can 
address directly. It provides additional documentation of the importance of developing 
shelter-in-place plans in a broad array of community buildings and of making all of 
the people who use those buildings very aware of the plans. As with our ﬁndings in the 
smallpox situation, the analysis links people’s cooperation with their trust in oﬃcial 
instructions. In addition, it links cooperation levels in the dirty bomb situation to people’s 
conﬁdence in community preparedness plans.
Cooperation is signiﬁcantly lower among people who lack conﬁdence in their 
community’s preparedness plans (8% of the American population). In the survey, these 
people say that (1) their community is not at all or only a little prepared to deal with the 
kinds of terrorist attacks discussed in the survey; (2) the people making plans to deal with 
terrorist attacks in their community know nothing at all or only a little about the concerns 
they would have and the information they would want in these sorts of situations; (3) they 
deﬁnitely would not or probably would not receive the help they need when they need 
it if a terrorist attack were to happen in their community; and/or (4) in the event of a 
smallpox outbreak, they deﬁnitely could not or probably could not get the vaccine in time 
to prevent them from getting smallpox.
The public’s full cooperation in the dirty bomb situation could be 
increased substantially by developing shelter-in-place plans in the places 
people frequently are in and making people very aware of those plans; by 
strengthening people’s conﬁdence in community preparedness plans; and by 
enhancing people’s trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions.
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People can be deﬁned as cooperating fully in the dirty bomb situation if they would 
stay inside the building they are in for as long as they are told. As Figure 13 illustrates, 
cooperation is very low (35%) among people who lack conﬁdence in community 
preparedness plans, do not know a great deal or a lot about what the managers of the 
building they are in would do to take care of the people inside, and do not have a lot of 
trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions. 
Cooperation is 51% higher (53%) among people who have the characteristics above but 
do not lack conﬁdence in community preparedness plans. 
Cooperation is 86% higher (65%) among people who do not lack conﬁdence in 
community preparedness plans and either know a great deal or a lot about what the 
managers of the building they are in would do to provide them with shelter or have a lot 
of trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions.
Figure 13 – Impact of Three Factors on the Public’s 
Cooperation in the Dirty Bomb Situation
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Cooperation is 117% higher (76%) among people who do not lack conﬁdence in plans, 
know a great deal or a lot about what the managers of the building they are in would do, 
and have a lot of trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions.
How concerned is the American public about the long-term 
consequences of a dirty bomb?
Currently, most of the planning for dirty bomb attacks focuses on the short-term impact 
of the explosion.51 Yet, as Figure 14 illustrates, if a dirty bomb explosion were to occur, 
three-quarters of the American people would be very concerned about the long-term 
consequences. People would be more concerned about environmental and economic 
issues than about health issues. This ﬁnding suggests that communities may face serious 
and unanticipated consequences if long-term issues are not adequately addressed in the 
plans that are being developed. 
Figure 14 – Concerns About Long-Term Consequences 
in the Dirty Bomb Situation
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What would dirty bomb plans look like if they incorporated the 
public’s perspectives? 
Dirty bomb explosions have been the focus of well-publicized exercises, like TOPOFF 
2. To prepare the public to protect themselves in such a situation, planners have been 
conducting education campaigns that instruct people to assemble three days of supplies in 
their home and to take shelter in the nearest undamaged building if an explosion occurs 
when they are not at home. These campaigns may explain, at least in part, why 59% of the 
American people say they would stay inside the building they are in for as long as they are 
told in a dirty bomb situation. 
But 41% of the population would either not follow such instructions or be unsure about 
what to do, and our study suggests that public education alone will not be suﬃcient 
to obtain their full cooperation. Many people are likely to be in places other than their 
home when a dirty bomb explosion occurs. As we have learned, very few people know 
how they, or the people they love, would actually be cared for if they had to stay in those 
places — most likely because few places have prepared to function as safe havens in the 
event of an emergency or, if they have prepared, the public has not been informed of these 
preparations. Even when people are aware of such plans, it doesn’t mean they are conﬁdent 
that the people at the site would be provided with adequate shelter. Compounding 
the problem, members of many families are likely to be in diﬀerent locations when an 
explosion occurs. If telephone service fails, those who stay inside a building will not be 
able to ﬁnd out whether other family members are safe or not. 
Below, we illustrate what plans to deal with a dirty bomb explosion would look like 
if these issues were taken into account. The steps we lay out, which would need to be 
taken well before an attack occurred, would make sheltering in place a feasible option 
for a greater proportion of the American people, and would begin to address the public’s 
serious concerns about the long-term consequences of a dirty bomb explosion. Some of 
the strategies in the plan are applicable to other situations where sheltering in place would 
provide safety (for example, when people are at work and cannot get home in a blackout) 
or where long-term environmental consequences are an issue (the malfunction of a nuclear 
reactor, for instance). 
 41 Redeﬁning Readiness
Dirty Bomb Planning Through the Eyes of the Public
Steps that Would Make Sheltering in Place Feasible for More People
(1) Promote widespread awareness of, and conﬁdence in, the way the managers of 
the buildings people are frequently in (and the buildings the people they care about 
are frequently in) would handle a shelter-in-place emergency. 
A broad array of places fall into this category, including work sites, 
shops, malls, schools, day care centers, hospitals and clinics, cultural 
institutions, recreational and entertainment facilities, government 
buildings, apartment buildings, and transportation terminals. Managers 
of such places need to recognize that their sites may have to function as 
safe havens in the event of a dirty bomb explosion (or other emergencies, 
such as a blackout) and that it is as important to make plans to serve as 
a safe haven as to be able to evacuate people in the event of a ﬁre or an 
explosion. 
To give people conﬁdence in shelter-in-place plans, the managers of such 
places need to work with the kinds of people who are frequently at their 
sites (including the parents of children who attend schools and day care 
centers) to develop strategies for keeping the people inside fed and safe 
for several days in the event of a shelter-in-place emergency. Information 
about such plans needs to be broadly disseminated among everyone 
who is frequently in (or responsible for people in) each site, with special 
attention to people who are African-American, Hispanic, have young 
children, and live in New York City. 
(2) Address the public’s communications issues by working to develop back-up 
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(3) Meaningfully involve a broad array of community residents in other kinds of 
community preparedness planning so they will be conﬁdent that planners know a 
lot about their concerns and information needs, that they and their family members 
would receive the help they need when they need it, and that their community is well 
prepared to deal with a terrorist attack. 
(4) Build people’s trust in what government oﬃcials would say and do in these 
situations. In New York City, this involves explicitly addressing what happened 
at the World Trade Center on 9/11 and taking steps to assure that, in the future, 
oﬃcials have accurate information about the stability of buildings so they do not 
inadvertently instruct people to stay or return to a building that is in danger of 
collapsing. 
Steps to Deal with the Long-Term Consequences of a Dirty Bomb
(1) Engage the general public in frank discussions about the potential environmental, 
economic, and health consequences of a dirty bomb. Develop, and inform the public 
about, decontamination and other plans to eﬀectively address issues related to: 
air, water, and food safety;
jobs and businesses;
long-term health eﬀects; and
compensation for people who become sick or lose their home or business as a result 
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PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ABOUT TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS 
PLANNING
The public’s safety in terrorist attack situations like a smallpox outbreak or a dirty bomb 
explosion depends on much more than what individuals or households can do on their 
own. The plans that government agencies and private-sector organizations develop and 
the actions they take will largely determine how well the public is protected. As we have 
documented in the study ﬁndings presented thus far, the American people have a lot to 
contribute to community and organizational preparedness planning. They are the only 
ones who really know the diﬃcult decisions that community residents would face in 
these kinds of situations and the conﬂicts and barriers that would that prevent them from 
following oﬃcial instructions. Their insights can help planners identify strategies that will 
enable the greatest possible number of people to engage in protective behaviors. 
Since the American public has had little or no role in helping government agencies and 
private-sector organizations develop terrorism preparedness plans, the survey included 
questions that explore people’s thoughts about current preparedness plans and their 
interest in participating in community or organizational planning. While some of our 
ﬁndings corroborate observations made in other studies, most of what we report is new 
information.17, 52 
How much do the American people currently know about terrorism 
preparedness plans in their communities? 
The Redeﬁning Readiness Study documents that very few people in the United States 
(only 3% of the population) know much about plans that are being developed by 
government agencies or other community organizations to deal with situations like a 
smallpox outbreak or the explosion of a dirty bomb. Three-quarters of the population 
(74%) say they are not aware of any plans. Only 3% say they know a great deal or a lot 
about such plans. People who are Hispanic or under 40 are even less likely to have this 
level of awareness. 
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What are the American public’s views about current planning 
activities?
Our study paints a mostly discouraging picture about people’s perceptions about current 
planning activities. 
Half of the American people (55%) say their community is not at all or only 
a little prepared to deal with the kinds of terrorist attacks addressed in the 
survey. Only 11% think their community is extremely or very prepared. 
Not being prepared matters because 61% of the population believe that the 
harm caused by a terrorist attack in their community could be reduced a 
great deal or a lot by preparing ahead of time to deal with the eﬀects. 
Two-ﬁfths of the American people (44%) think that planners know nothing 
at all or only a little about the concerns they would have and the information 
they would want in these sorts of situations. 
Two-ﬁfths of the population (41%) believe that people like them can have no 
inﬂuence or only a little inﬂuence on the plans that government agencies or 
other community organizations are developing to deal with possible terrorist 
attacks. 
Half of the American people (47%) are not conﬁdent that they and the 
people they care about would receive the help they need when they need it. 
One-ﬁfth (12%) say that they and the people they care about deﬁnitely would 
not or probably would not receive the help they need when they need it. An 
additional 35% think they might or might not get that help.
How interested is the American public in preparedness planning 
activities? 
An important ﬁnding of our study is the documentation that a large proportion of the 
American people are interested in community-level planning — not just in learning 
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Half of the population (47%) say they are extremely or very interested in 
learning more about the plans that government agencies or other community 
organizations currently have to deal with the kinds of situations covered in the 
survey (77% are moderately to extremely interested in learning more).
Three-ﬁfths of the population (62%) believe it is extremely or very important 
for people like them to work with government agencies or other community 
organizations to develop plans to deal with these kinds of situations (84% of 
the population believe this is moderately to extremely important). 
One-third of the American people (34%) say they are extremely or very 
interested in personally helping a government agency or community 
organization develop plans to deal with these kinds of situations (65% are 
moderately to extremely interested in being personally involved). 
What makes people extremely or very interested in personally helping 
to develop community and organizational plans? 
Salience is clearly important, but so are other factors. 
We used multivariate logistic regression to look at the broad range of factors that could 
potentially inﬂuence whether people are extremely or very interested in personally helping 
to develop community and organizational plans. 
We found that strong personal interest in participating in planning is positively correlated 
with:
ﬁnding terrorist attacks to be very salient (odds ratio = 3.7);
believing that you can have a great deal or a lot of inﬂuence on plans (odds 
ratio = 2.7);
believing that preparing ahead of time can reduce harms a great deal or a lot 
(odds ratio = 1.9); and
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Strong personal interest in participating in planning is negatively correlated with: 
ﬁnding terrorist attacks not to be salient (odds ratio = .42); and
having a very high income (odds ratio = .32).
Taking the factors above into account, being extremely or very interested in personally 
helping to develop plans is not signiﬁcantly correlated with other sociodemographic factors 
(age, gender, race/ethnicity, place of birth, children, household size, health insurance 
coverage); where people live (i.e., in New York City, Washington, D.C., or the rest of the 
continental United States); their cooperation in the smallpox and dirty bomb scenarios; 
or other constructs in our analysis (people’s awareness of plans; conﬁdence in plans; 
knowledge level, or trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions). 
It is to be expected that people’s strong personal interest in developing terrorism 
preparedness plans is linked to how salient they ﬁnd terrorist attacks to be. Overall, only 
4% of the American population ﬁnd terrorist attacks to be very salient. In the survey, these 
people say they have thought about the possibility of a future terrorist attack a great deal 
or a lot during the last two months and think it is extremely or very likely that a terrorist 
attack will happen somewhere in their community during the next 10 years. Terrorist 
attacks are considerably more likely to be very salient to people who live in Washington, 
D.C. (19%), New York City (15%), or who are African-American (8%). 
Salience is not the only factor linked to high levels of personal interest, however. While 
the proportion of people who are extremely or very interested in personally helping 
to develop plans is particularly high in New York City (44%) and Washington, D.C. 
(40%), over a third of the population in the rest of the country (34%) express this level 
of personal interest. Our analysis documents the other factors that are linked to strong 
personal interest: (1) believing that you can have a great deal or a lot of inﬂuence on plans 
(i.e., that if you devote your time to community or organizational planning, it will make 
a diﬀerence); (2) believing that preparing ahead of time can reduce harms a great deal or 
a lot (i.e., that you and other people in the community will be better oﬀ because of your 
eﬀorts); and (3) education and income levels. 
•
•
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By assuring community residents an inﬂuential role in planning and by 
focusing their involvement on reducing the harms they care a lot about, 
planners could boost strong personal interest in helping government 
agencies and community organizations develop plans to 56% among people 
for whom terrorist attacks are not salient, and to 89% among people for 
whom terrorist attacks are salient. 
Figure 15 – Factors Associated with Strong Personal Interest in Community and 
Organizational Planning
As Figure 15 illustrates, only 19% of the people who do not believe that they can have 
much inﬂuence on plans, do not believe that planning can have much impact on reducing 
harms, and do not ﬁnd terrorist attacks to be salient are extremely or very interested in 
personally helping government agencies or other community organizations to develop 
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terrorism preparedness plans. The low level of interest in this baseline group is not 
surprising since there is not much motivating people with these beliefs to invest their time 
and energy in planning. 
Salience alone is not associated with a signiﬁcantly greater interest in participating in 
planning. 35% of people for whom terrorist attacks are salient, but who otherwise share 
the characteristics described above are extremely or very interested in personally helping to 
develop plans. This proportion is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the baseline value. 
Among people who believe that that they can have a lot of inﬂuence on plans and that 
preparing ahead of time can reduce harms a lot, strong personal interest in participating 
in planning is threefold greater than baseline, even among people for whom terrorist 
attacks are not salient. This ﬁnding suggests that a process that assures people meaningful 
inﬂuence in planning and that focuses on reducing the harms that people care about a lot 
could boost interest in planning to 56% among the people for whom terrorist attacks are 
not very salient. 
Almost everyone for whom terrorist attacks are salient and who believe that planning 
can reduce harms a lot and that they can have a lot of inﬂuence on plans are extremely 
or very interested in personally helping to develop plans. The interest level in this group 
is over four times greater than baseline. This ﬁnding suggests that a process that assures 
community residents meaningful inﬂuence in planning and that focuses on reducing the 
harms that people care about a lot could increase interest to 89% among the people for 
whom terrorist attacks are salient. 
How should the American public be involved in future planning 
eﬀorts? 
Considering what is at stake if the nation’s terrorism preparedness plans are based 
on misconceptions about the public, planners are very fortunate that the public is so 
interested in participating in community and organizational planning eﬀorts. As the 
Redeﬁning Readiness Study demonstrates, when the American people have an opportunity 
to speak for themselves, planners no longer have to guess about their concerns or behavior. 
By incorporating the public’s insights in plans, planners can develop more behaviorally 
realistic approaches for dealing with emergency situations and, as a result, protect many 
more people than would otherwise be possible. 
 49 Redeﬁning Readiness
Giving the American people a meaningful voice in planning is also a way to enhance 
their cooperation with protective instructions in emergency situations. Our study 
shows that people are more likely to follow such instructions when they have a lot of 
trust in what oﬃcials tell them to do and are conﬁdent that their community is prepared 
to meet their needs if a terrorist attack occurs. Currently, people’s trust and conﬁdence 
levels are disturbingly low. But elected oﬃcials, government agencies, and private sector 
organizations have a unique opportunity to build the public’s trust, conﬁdence, and 
cooperation by involving the public directly in planning. When community residents 
are part of the planning process, they can be more conﬁdent that planners are actually 
aware of their concerns. When community residents play a role in developing protective 
strategies, they can be more trusting of oﬃcials who instruct them to follow those 
strategies. 
In our conversations with planners, some were concerned that involvement in terrorism 
preparedness planning would be frightening to the public. Consistent with the work of 
other investigators, we did not ﬁnd that to be the case.53-54 As we learned in the group 
discussions we held with community residents around the country, people are already 
thinking about the possibilities of terrorist attacks. Although the participants in the group 
discussions thought the smallpox and dirty bomb scenarios were very realistic, they were 
not frightened by talking about these situations. Quite the contrary, many appeared to 
be empowered by having an opportunity to think about these situations and discuss the 
issues that would matter to them most.
Many of the planners we spoke with wanted to know how to engage the public in 
terrorism preparedness planning. Our study demonstrates that in order to make 
participation in planning worthwhile to community residents, the process needs to 
assure them considerable inﬂuence in planning and needs to focus their involvement 
on identifying and addressing the issues that they care about a lot. As others have 
emphasized, to conduct such a process planners need to approach the public as peers with 
valuable knowledge to oﬀer.20,55 They need to ﬁnd out how community residents think 
about emergency situations rather than what they think about plans that have already 
been developed.2,16,56 Equally important, planners need to expect that public involvement 
will make plans diﬀerent — and better — than they would have been otherwise.54
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We recognize from our conversations with planners that this kind of inclusive process 
would entail a substantial change in the way many planners currently go about their 
work, and that there are a variety of barriers that currently make it diﬃcult for planners 
to move in this direction.9,57-59 Nonetheless, the stakes are too high to continue the status 
quo. The safety and protection of the American people depend on having plans based on 
accurate information about their concerns and behavior, and the only way to obtain that 
information is to ask the American people themselves. 
The Redeﬁning Readiness Study provides planners in government agencies and private-
sector organizations with reliable information from the public that they can use to assess 
and strengthen their plans to deal with smallpox, dirty bombs, and related situations. 
Planners will have to work with community residents directly, however, to develop plans 
that can respond eﬀectively to other kinds of terrorist attack and emergency situations and 
to make needed headway in building the public’s trust. To provide planners will practical 
models for engaging the public in these kinds of activities, our next step will be to support 
planning processes in selected sites around the country that demonstrate exactly how 
community residents can be meaningfully and feasibly engaged. The kinds of scenarios and 
group discussions that were developed for this study will lay a strong foundation for those 
endeavors.
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Study Methods
T
his report of the Redeﬁning Readiness Study is based on information 
obtained from multiple sources: group discussions with community 
residents around the country; conversations with government and 
private-sector planners; a review of the planning and survey literature; and a 
national telephone survey. Below, we describe these data sources and the methods 
that were used to analyze the survey data.  
Group Discussions with Community Residents 
From late August through early October 2003, we engaged community residents 
around the country in 14 group discussions. The purpose of these discussions 
was to lay the foundation for the telephone survey by identifying language and 
a frame of reference for thinking about terrorism preparedness planning that is 
meaningful to a broad array of people and that allows them to contribute their 
perspectives in a constructive way. 
The discussions were carefully structured to avoid limiting or predetermining 
what people thought. Since it is very diﬃcult for people to talk about terrorist 
attacks or planning in the abstract, most of the discussions were grounded in two 
speciﬁc and realistic situations: a smallpox outbreak and the explosion of a dirty 
bomb. We found that only by placing people within such situations could we 
obtain meaningful information about what they would think about and do and 
what they believe others would need to do to minimize the harms that they and 
the people they care about might experience. 
The discussion guides went through extensive pilot testing and revision before 
they were ﬁelded. The New York Academy of Medicine Institutional Review 
Board reviewed and approved the discussion guide, the post-discussion 
participant questionnaire, and the ﬁnancial incentive for participants. Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants prior to the start of the group 
discussions. All discussions were audiotaped and transcribed. 
To make sure we would hear a broad range of perspectives, we conducted 
discussions in urban, suburban, and rural communities; communities that do 
and do not routinely experience natural disasters; and communities that had 
and had not directly experienced the 9/11 attacks. Participants involved men 
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and women spanning a broad age range, living in households with and without children, 
and encompassing diverse racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, educational, and occupational 
backgrounds. Some discussions intentionally involved people from a single racial or 
ethnic group, and a Spanish translator participated in all of the discussions with Hispanic 
residents. The sites and populations for the discussions are listed below.
Cerro Gordo County, IA (general population including farmers)
Chicago, IL (general population including commuters)
District of Columbia (African-American and other Black population)
Lubbock, TX (general population, including ranchers and farmers)
Miami, FL (Cuban, other Hispanic, and general population)
New York City, NY (general non-Hispanic population)
New York City, NY (Puerto Rican, Dominican, and other Hispanic population)
Prince William, VA (general population, including commuters)
San Jose, CA (general non-Hispanic population)
San Jose, CA (Mexican and other Hispanic population)
Savannah, GA (Caucasian population)
Savannah, GA (African-American population)
Seattle, WA (Asian and other multicultural population)
Seattle, WA (suburban and commuter population)
To reduce the potential for bias, we made considerable eﬀort to recruit participants 
who had never participated in a focus group, and we did not tell the people who were 
recruited what the topic would be beforehand. When community residents found out 
about the topic when they arrived for the discussions, they were very interested and 
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whether they did or not. We found that the scenarios were realistic to participants, but 
as documented in the post-discussion questionnaire, engaging in this type of discussion 
was not a frightening experience for them. Quite the contrary, participants appeared to be 
very energized by the discussions — there was a lot they wanted to say and many people 
continued the discussions on their own after the formal activity had concluded. 
Conversations with Planners 
In September and October 2003, we engaged in conﬁdential telephone conversations 
with government and private-sector planners in four representative communities around 
the country. (To protect conﬁdentiality, we cannot identify the speciﬁc communities.) 
The sites we selected included urban, suburban, and rural communities located in the 
Northwest, Midwest, Atlantic, and Southeast regions of the United States. To learn 
about terrorism preparedness planning in each site, we spoke with the people who are 
responsible for community-wide emergency preparedness, state and local planning 
funded by federal terrorism preparedness grants, emergency planning for the local school 
district(s), and emergency planning for a major community employer. 
A key objective of these discussions was to identify the critical assumptions about the 
public on which current plans are based as well as the speciﬁc questions about public 
perspectives and behavior that local planners have. The conversations focused on the 
same smallpox and dirty bomb scenarios as did the group discussions with the general 
public. The scenarios were modiﬁed slightly, however, so that each type of planner was 
put in each situation at a place and time that they would be likely to ﬁnd out about it and 
need to decide what to do. The conversations explored the plausibility of each scenario, 
how the planners would be likely to respond, what they thought the public would be 
concerned about and want to know, what they would want the public to do, and what 
they thought the public would actually do. The conversations also explored each planner’s 
experience with, and ideas about, engaging the public in terrorism preparedness planning. 
To supplement what we learned in these conversations, we also spoke with key informants 
in federal agencies, national associations, and academic institutions involved in terrorism 
preparedness planning. 
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Literature Review
For more than a year, beginning in June 2003, we conducted an extensive review of 
published literature, web sites, and surveys related to terrorism preparedness planning. The 
purpose of this review was to ﬁnd out as much as possible about (1) the actual plans that 
are being developed to deal with smallpox and dirty bomb attacks in the United States; 
(2) how planners are communicating with the public, including the speciﬁc information 
about smallpox, dirty bombs, and terrorism preparedness planning that is available, or 
actively being provided, to the public; (3) the nature and extent of public involvement in 
terrorism preparedness planning; (4) what is known about human behavior in emergency 
situations; and (5) the particular questions that the public has been asked about smallpox, 
dirty bombs, and terrorism preparedness in national and local surveys and public opinion 
polls. This review indicated that most of the issues raised by the community residents 
in the group discussions we held around the country, and subsequently explored in our 
national telephone survey, have not been covered in previous surveys and public opinion 
polls. A list of the sources we reviewed can be accessed at www.cacsh.org.
National Telephone Survey 
The quantitative information in this report comes from a telephone survey of 2,545 
randomly selected adult residents of households in the continental United States. Below 
we discuss the development of the survey questionnaire, sample design and survey 
implementation, and data analysis. 
Development of the Survey Questionnaire
The 25-minute telephone questionnaire used in the survey is presented in the Appendix to 
this report. The language, frame of reference, content, and scenarios in the questionnaire 
are based on the group discussions with the community residents, conversations with 
planners, and literature review described above. Most of the questions in the survey 
used a ﬁve-point scale. We conducted three rounds of cognitive interviews to assure that 
the questionnaire would be clear, relevant, and interpreted uniformly among people of 
diﬀerent racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, educational, and geographic backgrounds. The 
ﬁrst round of interviews was conducted face-to-face, using “think-aloud” techniques. The 
second and third rounds of interviews were conducted over the telephone, using speciﬁc 
probes. 
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The survey was translated into Spanish by a team of experts who speak diﬀerent 
dialects. The Spanish questionnaire was then reﬁned based on what we learned from 
cognitive interviews with people from diﬀerent Spanish-speaking countries and diﬀerent 
educational backgrounds and from back-translating the questionnaire into English. 
Critical language issues were identiﬁed through this process. For example, we found that 
the terms for smallpox and chickenpox are identical in some Spanish-speaking countries 
and that a commonly used translation of “investigational drug” connotes an illicit drug 
for some Spanish speakers. These issues were addressed in the ﬁnal version of the Spanish 
questionnaire. 
Sample Design and Survey Implementation 
The survey was ﬁelded by the Survey Research Center at the Institute for Social Research 
at the University of Michigan (SRC). The sample population for the survey included 
adults, 18 years of age and older, who reside in households in the continental United 
States served by standard land-line telephone service. An adult household member was 
randomly selected as the respondent. 
The sample was selected using a list-assisted random digit dialing (RDD) sample design.60   
The telephone numbers were drawn from a national frame developed and maintained 
by Genesys Sampling Systems. To capture perspectives that might otherwise be under-
represented, the survey oversampled African Americans and people in the cities that were 
directly aﬀected by the 9/11 attacks (New York City and Washington, D.C.)   To achieve 
these oversampling goals, we used a sample design involving four strata: the ﬁve boroughs 
of New York City; the District of Columbia; areas in the remainder of the United States in 
which 25% or more of household telephone service customers are expected to be African- 
American; and areas in the remainder of the United States in which less than 25% of 
household telephone service customers are expected to be African-American. Diﬀerential 
sampling rates were used in each of the four strata to achieve the completed interview 
targets for the subpopulations. 
SRC’s intensively trained telephone interviewing staﬀ conducted computer-assisted 
telephone interviews between January 19, 2004 and June 3, 2004. The sample was 
released for interviewing in replicates. Each sample RDD telephone number was dialed 
until contact with a household member was made or a nonsample disposition was 
determined (e.g., nonworking number, business or nonhousehold number). Up to 12 
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contact attempts were made with each telephone number, using a call grid that distributed 
contact attempts over days of the week, times of day, and weeks of the ﬁeld period. In 
the ﬁnal month of the ﬁeld period, SRC sampling statisticians implemented a two-phase 
subsampling of outstanding no contact and resistant cases.61-62 This strategy enabled 
interviewers to focus their eﬀorts on a random subsample of outstanding cases, improving 
the ﬁnal representation of the sample and yielding better data quality for the ﬁnal hard-to-
reach and hard-to-interview cases.
A total of 2,545 interviews were completed during the ﬁeld period. This total includes 392 
interviews in New York City, 526 interviews in Washington, D.C., and 1,627 interviews 
in the rest of the country. Six hundred and ﬁfty-eight of the respondents were African 
Amercians. To control for question-order eﬀects, each respondent was randomly assigned 
one of two forms of the survey, which diﬀered from each other in the order in which 
response categories were presented. Final analysis weights were constructed to adjust 
for sample selection probability, stratum-speciﬁc nonresponse, and small diﬀerences in 
demographics between the ﬁnal sample in each stratum and corresponding estimates from 
3-year averages (2001–2003) of the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey, 
a large annual survey undertaken by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
Final cooperation and response rates for the sample were computed using the American 
Association of Public Opinion Research guidelines.63 The respondent-level cooperation rate 
(Cooperation Rate 3) for the combined sample is 96.5%. The AAPOR RR3 response rate 
for the combined sample is 50.7%. This is an excellent response rate, especially considering 
the decline in telephone survey response rates in the last 10 years.64 In recent analyses of 
RDD surveys, the mean response rate has been 46% for government surveys and 12% for 
surveys in the commercial sector.65-66 In New York City and Washington, D.C., response 
rates have been much lower than for the nation as a whole.67  
The Institutional Review Boards at The New York Academy of Medicine and the 
University of Michigan reviewed and approved the survey questionnaire, interviewer 
introduction scripts, respondent pre-notiﬁcation letters, interviewer answering machine 
scripts, and refusal conversion protocols. In the debrieﬁng section of the survey, all 
respondents were asked about their emotional state and were oﬀered two options for 
talking to a counselor: a toll-free number they could call or having a counselor call them. 
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Fewer than 1% of respondents requested the number for the counselor and none called. 
Data Analysis 
The weighted national responses for all of the questions in the survey are presented in the 
Appendix. In the analyses presented in this report, we adjusted for the study’s stratiﬁed 
sampling design using the survey procedures in Stata 8.0. These procedures adjust 
estimates of means, logistic analysis odds ratios, and standard errors to reﬂect both the 
stratiﬁed sample and the weighting adjustments. We used F-tests, adjusted for sample 
design, to assess the statistical signiﬁcance of estimated diﬀerences. Unless otherwise 
noted, all comparisons presented in the report are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 95% 
conﬁdence level.
Most survey responses used a 5-point scale. For many of the analyses, we dichotomized 
responses, comparing respondents who gave the highest two answers (usually “extremely” 
and “very”) to those who gave the other three responses. For some analyses, we developed 
constructs using predetermined deﬁnitions that combined responses to several questions. 
When developing constructs, we coded as missing those cases where respondents failed 
to answer any of the constituent questions. Even in the case with the most missing 
observations, fewer than 7% had missing values. Omitting this construct in multivariate 
analyses had no substantive eﬀect on any other results. Construct deﬁnitions are presented 
below.
Construct Deﬁnitions
Cooperation with protective instructions
Cooperation in the smallpox scenario:  respond “rush or go later” to Q7
Cooperation in the dirty bomb scenario: respond “stay inside” to Q25 and 
“yes; would stay as long as authorities say” to Q25a
Nonspeciﬁc worry 
Nonspeciﬁc worrier: respond “extremely or very worried” to Q8, Q9, 
Q10, Q18, Q28, Q29, Q30, and Q31 
Nonworrier: respond “not at all or slightly worried” to Q8, Q9, Q10, 
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Trust in oﬃcial instructions and actions
A lot of trust: respond “not at all or slightly worried” to Q 11 and “no or 
slight chance” to Q20
Lack of trust: respond “extremely or very worried” to Q11 and “very or 
high chance” to Q20 
Conﬁdence in plans
A lot of conﬁdence: respond in the following way to at least 3 of the 
following questions: “deﬁnitely or probably could” to Q16; “a great deal or 
a lot” to Q34; “deﬁnitely or probably would” to Q35; “extremely or very 
prepared” to Q36.
Lack of conﬁdence: “deﬁnitely or probably could not” to Q16; “nothing at 
all or a little” to Q34; “deﬁnitely or probably would not” to Q35; “not at 
all or a little prepared” to Q36.
Salience of terrorist attacks 
Very salient: respond “a great deal or a lot” to Q3 and “extremely or very 
likely” to Q41
Not salient: respond “not at all or a little” to Q3 and “not at all or slightly 
likely” to Q41
Awareness of plans 
Very aware: respond “a great deal or a lot” to Q26, Q27, and Q32a 
Not aware: respond “nothing at all or a little” to Q26, Q27, and Q32a;  or 
respond “nothing at all or a little” to Q26 and Q27 and ”am not aware” to 
Q32
Knowledge level 
Well-informed: respond “Yes, did know it” to at least 5 of the following 
questions: Q4, Q5, Q6, Q22, Q23, Q24
Uninformed: respond “No, did not know it” to at least 5 of the following 
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